SAC057 / non-FQDN Certs

Fun with TLDs...

Background

- https://requires a public key, carried in a certificate.
- o Obtain this from a Certification Authority
- o Binds public key to identity
- Browser uses this to make sure it is talking to the correct server.

Validation

- Validation* is simply receiving a token in email at an address (webmaster@, the email address in WHOIS)
- Reply with the token to prove "ownership" of the domain.

^{*:} Domain Validated certificates. EV / OV have more stringent validation.

Internal Server Names


- Designed for "internal only" type applications.
 - Often used by Microsoft Exchange, Active Directory.
- o www.corp, www.accounting, mail.test
- o Doesn't end in a TLD
 - o can't be used on the Internet
 - nowhere to send the validation email

What's a TLD?

Certificate request

```
Certificate Request:
  Data:
  Version: 0 (0x0)
    Subject: C=US, ST=VA, L=Dulles,
O=Dulles Steel and Forge Supplies,
OU=IT - Internal WWW Site.,
CN=www.site/emailAddress=warren@kumari.net
      Subject Public Key Info:
        Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
        RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
        Modulus (2048 bit):
          00:da:ef:bd:d0:ee:db:...
```

Internal Name Certificate?




Issued Certificate

```
Data:
 Serial Number:
   27:e7:22:63:59:11:b0
 Signature Algorithm: shalWithRSAEncryption
 Issuer: C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale,
   O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., OU=http://
certificates.godaddy.com/repository, CN=Go Daddy Secure
Certification Authority/serialNumber=07969287
  Validity
    Not Before: Oct 2 23:56:35 2012 GMT
    Not After: Oct 2 23:56:35 2013 GMT
  Subject: O=www.site, OU=Domain Control Validated,
           CN=www.site
 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                DNS:www.site, DNS:site
```


Testing

- Setup a fake root
- o Delegated site to myself
- o Setup a webserver, serving the cert

Doh!



Doh!



So what?

- 1. Get a certificate for something ending in an applied for TLD.
- 2. Wait for it to be delegated.
- 3. Hang out in Starbucks, or a hotel, or domain hijack, or cache-poison, or DHCP poison, or...
- 4. Present this cert, get the lock icon.
- 5. Steal banking credentials, cookies, etc

Investigations

- SSAC formed a work party
- Researched prevalence of non-FQDN certs
 - Using the EFF SSL Observatory data
 - 1,053 Internal Server Name certificates ending in 63 applied-for TLD
 - o Lower bounds estimate

Investigations

- Confidentiality issues
- o Responsible Disclosure
 - Security Team
 - Contacted CA/B Forum
 - "Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure"

CA/B Forum

- o CA/B Forum stepped up.
- Already had started deprecating internal certs, but speeded things up:
 - Stop issuing within 30 days of each new gTLD approval
 - o Revoke within 120 days
 - Unless customer proves domain ownership.

Solved? Nope...

- Not all CAs are members of the CA/B Forum
 - So not bound by these agreements
 - But generally trustworthy / follow guidelines
- Revocation ineffective*
 - Blocking CRL / OSCP / air-gapped networks

Questions?